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THE RUSSIAN CHRISTIAN TAKE ON PUTIN AND UKRAINE 
 
 
By Mark R. Elliott 
 
Mark R. Elliott is editor of the East-West Church and Ministry Report, Asbury University, Wilmore, KY. 
An edited, abridged version of this article was published in Christianity Today Online, 7 January 2015; 
Kyiv Post, January 2015; and Nezavisimaya gazeta, 19 January 2015. The full text of the Ukraine crisis 
theme issue of the EWC&M Report 22 (Summer 2014) is available at www.eastwestreport.org in English, 
Ukrainian, and Russian. 
 
 
In late May 2014 in St. Petersburg, Russia’s Evangelical Christians-Baptists ended their 
every-fourth-year congress with a ringing endorsement of Vladimir Putin and his Ukraine 
policies: “Esteemed Vladimir Vladimirovich, we express to you sincere appreciation for your 
labor in the post of president for the welfare of our motherland….We reaffirm our principled 
loyalty with respect to state authority, based on the unchanged words of the Bible, ‘Let every 
soul be subject to the powers that be, for there is no authority not from God’ (Romans 13:1).” 
Citing Proverbs 24:21, “Do not join with rebellious officials,” the congress directly challenged 
the legitimacy of Ukraine’s Maidan Revolution and the February 2014 overthrow of pro-Russian 
President Viktor Yanukovich. 
The glowing commendation for Russia’s president and his Ukraine policies were so 
effusive, they brought to mind the praise church leaders had been periodically required to render 
unto Stalin and his Kremlin successors. Originally I suspected some back-room state pressure 
must have been at play. Surely these plaudits for Putin had been coerced. 
However, after a week of extended conversations with more than a dozen Protestant and 
Orthodox believers in Moscow, November 11-17, 2014, it became clear to me that no outside 
interference and no arm-twisting would have been necessary to generate such fulsome praise for 
Russia’s president. More than ever, Putin is genuinely popular—and admired—by Russians 
across the spectrum: among believers as well as the religiously indifferent, among Protestants as 
well as Orthodox, and among academics as well as taxi drivers. 
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Quite a few of those I interviewed in Moscow have family members in Ukraine, or are 
themselves originally from Ukraine. They figure their aggressively anti-Russian relatives across 
the border have been manipulated by Ukrainian propaganda. One pastor from Siberia whom I 
met in November explained to me that a Russian is more likely to believe Putin than his own 
sister if she lives in Ukraine. Most Russians just do not seem to recognize their own 
susceptibility to the Kremlin media campaign against Ukraine. A Russian Orthodox journalist—
and a rare opponent of Putin—shared with me that even the tiny Russian Quaker community is 
deeply divided over Ukraine, with a majority favoring Putin’s military moves there. 
A Protestant educator with longstanding, firsthand knowledge of U.S. academia put it to 
me this way: “We really thank God for Putin’s leadership. We do not want to protest as 
Ukrainians think we should. We have more and more rights.” Sasha (I will call him) reminded 
me that Yeltsin had given democracy a bad name—what with the chaos and economic crises that 
surrounded his presidency. Russia, I was told, needs a strong leader to prevent disorder and 
division, a sentiment in which many Russians still put great stock. Sasha continued, “Putin has 
brought stability; we have a better standard of living now; and we feel more secure.” Putin, 
he believes, has also managed to pacify Chechnya.  Corruption, Sasha says, is still a problem, but 
it is less so than it used to be. “I used to be stopped a lot by the police wanting a bribe to 
overlook some nonexistent traffic violation, but I have not been stopped for a bribe in four 
years.” Above all, Sasha—along with many millions of his fellow citizens—are grateful to Putin 
for restoring their sense of pride in being Russian. Sasha recalled the humiliation of the 1990s 
with its rudderless state and discarded ideology, its territorial losses, its economic and psychic 
dislocations, and its declining status in the world. Putin, I was given to understand, is about 
recovering Russia’s rightful place in world affairs, and Russians like the ring of that a lot. 
 Just weeks prior to my trip to Moscow, in a speech in Sochi, Putin held the U.S. 
responsible for orchestrating the downfall of Yanukovich and for failing to accord Russia its due 
in the international arena. His country’s expectation was that “our position would be taken into 
account, that we be treated with (uvazhenie) respect.” Tellingly, several times more in the same 
address Putin complained of the West’s failure to extend Russia proper respect.1  
Returning to my Moscow kitchen table talk, Sasha grew very upset with a reference to 
the Russian annexation of Crimea in a publication I had edited. His response was that NATO 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1Serge Schmemann, “Blaming the West for Things Gone Wrong,” New York Times, 31 October 2014. 
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tore Kosovo from Serbia in violation of international law that the West only selectively 
champions. And by what justification in international law did the U.S. invade and conquer Iraq? 
As for Ukraine, Russians overwhelmingly believe its new Maidan regime is simultaneously 
fascist and American-inspired, a “wild” land now reeling from Yeltsin-like chaos. I was told 
Maidan Ukraine cannot last, and “It’s terrible what is going on there.” 
Another longtime friend, an Orthodox believer who was educated in the U.S., argues the 
West is willing to believe anything negative about Russia, whatever the truth. “Artyom” 
admitted he did not trust Russian television, but he still holds positions strikingly at odds with 
Western perceptions of the Ukraine crisis. 
1. I was told that, besides volunteers crossing the border to fight with Ukrainian separatists, 
no real evidence exists that Russian regular troops are fighting in eastern Ukraine. 
2. I was told that CNN’s decision to suspend broadcasting in Russia, announced in Moscow 
the week I was there, did not stem from  Russian state pressure.2 
3. I was told the Soviet Union brought many good things to Ukraine including, at least early 
on, the option of Ukrainian language schooling and publications. 
4. I was told everyone in Crimea is happy, now that they are part of Russia. 
5. I also was informed it was very likely that Ukraine, not Russia, shot down Malaysian 
Airline Flight MH17 in July 2014.  
In response to so many assertions at variance with Western understanding of the Ukraine 
conflict, I will hazard some observations of my own. 
• Ukrainian evangelicals defend their support for the Maidan Revolution by arguing that it 
was their civic duty to oppose a corrupt and immoral regime. They compare their 
opposition to Yanukovich with Dietrich Bonheoffer’s resistance to Hitler, citing the 
martyred pastor’s dictum, “Obedience to tyrants is equal to disobedience towards God.” 3 
• Soviet tolerance for expressions of Ukrainian cultural sentiment were short-lived and pale 
before Stalin’s culpability in the death of millions of Ukrainians in the great famine of the 
1930s. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Mark Thompson, “CNN to End Broadcasts in Russia As New Laws Bite;” 12 November 2014. 
3Diana Chandler, “Russian, Ukrainian Baptists Voice Political Divide,” Baptist Press, 28 July 2014. 
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• Russian tanks and support vehicles have been photographed in eastern Ukraine, and 
Ukrainian forces have captured Russian military personnel in eastern Ukraine. 
• Recent Russian media legislation did influence CNN’s decision to end broadcasts in 
Russia. 
• Not everyone in Crimea is happy with Russia’s annexation: The peninsula’s Muslim 
Tatars, Catholics, Protestants, and even Orthodox not affiliated with the Moscow 
Patriarchate, are facing increased restrictions and discrimination. 4 
• The preponderance of evidence from the Dutch investigation of the downing of 
Malaysian Flight MH 17 suggests a Russian-supplied, surface-to-air missile fired by 
Ukrainian separatists was to blame. 
Corroboration for the fervent Russian patriotism of my friends in Moscow in mid-November 
comes from an email I received from a missionary couple (American and Ukrainian) serving in 
Russia: 
While I agree with the observations and most of the sentiments made in the [Ukraine 
theme issue of the East-West Church and Ministry Report 22 (Summer 2014)], I do believe 
one aspect of the situation was not covered. The thing is: Putin is wildly popular in Russia—
beloved by Christians and non-Christians alike. He is not seen by most as a dictator who 
must be tolerated or endured. My spouse refers to him as “God’s man for Russia in this 
hour.” Because of our missionary work we meet with many Protestant pastors in our region 
from different denominations, and they all unanimously support Putin. I do not believe this is 
due to propaganda, but rather is a result of the many positive changes he has brought to the 
country (mostly economic). I have heard pastors say, “There simply isn’t anyone else who 
would be capable of leading this great country.” There have been some prophecies about a 
great revival coming out of Russia, and many believe that Putin is paving the way for Russia 
to rise as a spiritual giant. 5 
 
 Two Russian Christian responses to the summer 2014 Ukraine crisis theme issue of the 
East-West Church and Ministry Report bear out the chasm between Russian perceptions  and 
Ukrainian and Western perceptions of the conflict, while also reflecting more balance and 
discernment than the more typical, black-and-white rhetoric of Russian—and Ukrainian-–
patriots. “Andrei,” an Evangelical Christian-Baptist pastor from southern Russia, shared: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Felix Corley, “Crimea: Guns, Weapons, Drugs—and Religious Literature,” Forum 18 News Service, 29 
October 2014; Gavin Drake, “Religious Leaders in Crimea Face Expulsion by Russia;” 
http://www.churchtimes.co.uk/articles/2014/7-november/news/world/). 
5 East-West Church and Ministry Report 22 [Fall 2014], 4. 
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I personally do not fully support the actions of our Russian government. For sure, 
the state distracts the public’s attention and manipulates people’s consciousness by 
searching for an external enemy in the face of domestic economic problems. I admit that 
Crimea was annexed, our soldiers invaded foreign territory, and our media do not tell the 
truth. At the same time, aggressive moves of other governments are also easily detected, 
for example, U.S.-engineered changes of government [in Ukraine] for reasons of profit as 
well as politics and the strongly nationalistic accent of the current regime in Kyiv. We 
Russian evangelicals find it very offensive when our Ukrainian brothers rebuke us 
demanding that we should oppose our Russian authorities and make our own “Maidan.” 
From our side, we take strong exception to Ukrainian evangelical support for Ukrainian 
ultra-nationalist and radical groups.  
 
Still, “Andrei” readily conceded we see through a glass darkly: 
We must clearly understand that we live in the midst of an information war, and 
that we should accept only proven facts—or at least understand that our views may be 
distorted because we simply do not have all the facts. One should put aside one’s 
loyalties and preconceptions in order to be objective. For most of us this is very difficult, 
or even impossible, because of our inability to be fully independent of our national, 
cultural, and spiritual allegiances. The way towards healing will be difficult, but we can 
take steps toward that end. We must consciously resist simplifications and black-and-
white thinking. 
 
 Russian Orthodox attorney Ekaterina Smyslova, a friend for decades who has assisted 
dozens of Western ministries in securing legal registration, has also bemoaned media bias: 
I know that believers in both countries now live under the heavy influence of 
secular mass media. Few in Russia believe that Ukrainians, driven to extreme measures 
by corruption and grim poverty, participated in Maidan protests and demanded political 
change of their own free will. Russian state-controlled mass media advance the idea that 
a fascist junta seized power in Ukraine. This junta, bribed with Western money, callously 
butchers peaceful people. Every day all Russian TV channels show bloody pictures 
illustrating the malfeasance of the junta. It motivates Russians to go to eastern Ukraine as 
volunteers to rescue local people dying there because of the fascists. In such a context 
anyone lifting a voice against Russian interference in Ukraine provokes social 
condemnation. 
 
  Putin has a well-oiled and expertly managed propaganda machine, but his is not the only 
source of media distortion in the present conflict. For example, without question, people are 
suffering and dying in eastern Ukraine at the hands of both Russian-backed separatists and 
Ukrainian Army units. But one would be hard-pressed to know of the extent of civilian casualties 
at the hands of both Russian and Ukrainian combatants if one depended upon any one source of 
media coverage alone, whether Russian, Ukrainian, or Western. For example, Western and 
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Ukrainian media infrequently report accounts such as the following: A pastor friend in Moscow 
has a new member in his congregation, a recently widowed pastor and tent evangelist from 
Lugansk, eastern Ukraine. A Ukrainian Army artillery shell took his wife’s life as she was 
standing on their apartment balcony: “After that,” this grieving father of two shared, “we almost 
immediately moved to Moscow. We don’t have any relatives in Moscow. I didn’t find a job here 
yet. There are difficulties with citizenship…. By God’s mercy there will be a job for me.” 
To date [late 2014], fighting in eastern Ukraine has claimed over 5,300 lives and over 
9,900 wounded. Refugees displaced by the fighting number nearly one million. An ethnic 
Russian pastor originally from Ukraine shared with me that he fears huge loss of civilian life in 
the war zone for lack of heat and food. Ultra-Orthodox separatists have closed dozens of 
Protestant and Catholic churches and the Protestant Donetsk Christian University. Rogue 
separatist units have kidnapped, tortured, and killed evangelical pastors. At the same time, in 
central and western Ukraine some Orthodox parishes and priests loyal to the Moscow 
Patriarchate have been harassed and pressured to switch their allegiance to one of two Ukraine-
based Orthodox jurisdictions. Piecing together a balanced picture of the Ukraine tragedy can 
only be attempted with a careful, inclusive reading of Russian, Ukrainian, and Western sources. 
Sadly, few observers have the ability—or the inclination—to weigh the merits of what is widely 
regarded as the propaganda of one’s opponents.  
Another sad casualty of the fighting is the loss of Christian community and collaboration 
in Kingdom work. Christian attorney Ekaterina Smyslova writes,  
Sadly, the Christian NGO, “Russia without Orphans,” no longer cooperates with 
its counterpart, “Ukraine without Orphans,” because Russian and Ukrainian leaders of 
these two charities disagree about the situation in Ukraine. Are our political disputes 
worth the cost of a home for thousands of orphans? Disagreements over Putin’s policies 
in Ukraine are taking place in all international ministries in Eurasia, and longstanding 
relationships and partnerships are being broken. What is going on, brothers and sisters? 
What are our priorities? How can we place our political views higher than issues of faith 
and mercy? If God is love, how can we consider that we know God if we are unable to 
love our neighbors unconditionally? 
 
Two additional conversations with Russian believers in Moscow bear repeating. The first 
I conducted with a thoroughgoing convert to Putinism. The second was with a pastor who, in the 
rising tide of national passions, defends his homeland, but who also reflects with humility and 
sorrow upon what is being lost spiritually in the Ukrainian crisis. In the first case, I visited with a 
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friend of 25 years standing who in the 1980s and 1990s had been an ardent and articulate 
evangelical advocate for democracy and a market economy. “Valentin,” who has stayed in my 
home, is now as anti-American as he ever was a supporter of Westernization: “From the age of 
17 I was strongly anti-Soviet, and I was very happy to see the fall of communism and the 
breakup of the Soviet Union. Then as Yeltsin made so many mistakes I was neutral politically. 
But now since radical Ukrainian nationalists have taken power in Kyiv, I am proud to be a 
Russian patriot.” 
“Daniel,” more thoughtful than “Valentin,” holds multiple degrees from U.S. seminaries. 
He supports Russian moves in Ukraine and considers Western support for the new government in 
Kyiv ill-considered: “The idea to play a ‘nationalistic card’ and make out of Russians the villains 
makes me sick. It seems to be the only way that Ukraine under the pretext of independence can 
slip from Russia’s influence.” Still, “Daniel” is more nuanced than most Muscovites I 
encountered, believing as he does that mass media, whether Russian, Ukrainian, or Western, 
distort the facts. He also assumes that the Russian—and Western—public may not be hearing the 
whole story of what is happening in eastern Ukraine. Like Ekaterina Smyslova, truly pained by 
the new divisions the Ukraine crisis has sown between Russian and Ukrainian Christians, he 
noted sadly, “There is national blood, and there is the blood of Christ. Which is thicker?” 
Believers in Ukraine and in the West would also do well to ponder this question because 
favoring loyalty to one’s earthly fatherland over one’s loyalty to God the Father is a temptation 
that knows no borders. 
 
